War Stories - Behind Enemy Lines

A lone telephone line kept an artillery liaison connected to offshore guns at Munda - did they make it in time? The single telephone line that called fire and bought ten days In this episode, we follow a single night on New Georgia when Japanese raiders systematically destroyed communications in the American rear and one unnamed liaison kept a line alive to call artillery. The episode traces the movements, decisions, and stakes that made a single telephone matter - could that connection hold long enough to buy the ten days the Americans needed? Person: Major General John Hester Person: Major General Oscar Griswold Person: Major General Minoru Sasaki Location: Munda Point, New Georgia Date: July 14-17, 1943 - Japanese raiders moved through the rear area with orders to destroy every switchboard and cut every telephone line before a coordinated assault. - Sasaki planned an envelopment: Tomonari’s thirteenth Infantry to circle through mangrove and ridgeline while Hirata’s 229th hit frontally. - By July 17 the American rear was fragmented into isolated pockets after systematic switchboard sabotage, leaving most units unable to call artillery. - An unnamed artillery liaison found one surviving telephone line, picked up the receiver, and began calling in shore-battery barrages within 150 yards of the divisional command post. - Griswold had requested roughly ten days to reorganize and push on Munda; the raiders’ timing aimed to erase that window and force decisive action.

A column of Australian soldiers waits at dawn on the swollen Busu River - did they make it in time? When the Busu Killed Thirteen: Lae's Forgotten River Massacre In this episode, we follow the Lae operation’s march toward a coastal objective and the decisions that shaped a costly movement through jungle and surf. The episode maps the planning, the mismatched training, and the moment a minor river became a decisive hazard - could better timing or a different choice have averted disaster? Date: September 4, 1943 Location: Busu River, near Lae Person: Brigadier Victor Windeyer Unit: Ninth Division, Australian Army Operation: Capture of Lae (Operation Cartwheel) - Three days of continuous jungle rain swelled the Busu into a 700-meter fast, chest-deep current that had not been expected on the maps. - Thirteen Australian soldiers drowned at 06:29 while crossing a river that had been treated as a minor obstacle in planning. - Landing rehearsals and six months of preparation had trained desert veterans in jungle movement and amphibious assault techniques before the Lae landings. - Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey refused to attempt beach location in total darkness, forcing a critical timing decision for the morning landings. - A document in Allied hands on September 13 described a route out of Lae ten days earlier than the final flag, yet a column proceeded along that corridor anyway.

A landing craft hits an uncharted sandbar off Gela at dawn, drowning men as waves and air leave the invasion exposed - did they make it in time? The sandbar that stopped the landing craft - and drowned men before help arrived In this episode, we lay out the opening hours of the Allied invasion at Gela on July 10, 1943, and the cascade of failures and unexpected terrain that met the assault. What happens when plan, timing, and weather collide at the waterline? Date: July 10, 1943 Location: Gela, Sicily Person: Vice Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt; Lieutenant General George S. Patton; Major Rubellino Event: Amphibious landing with paratrooper drops, naval fleet, and air support constraints Status: Paratroopers scattered; many landing craft disabled; coastal defenses intact - A single bomb sank USS Maddox at 04:58, throwing 212 men into the water before dawn. - The plan marshalled 601 ships and 1,124 shipboard landing boats but assumed surprise over pre-landing bombardment. - 3,400 paratroopers in 222 C-47s were supposed to secure Piano Lupo; fewer than 200 reached it, scattering across 60 miles. - No carriers sailed with the fleet, so fighters flew from North Africa with only minutes on station while Axis air launched over 500 sorties on day one. - Sandbars about 150 yards offshore, charts wrong and mine detectors corroded, stopped loaded landing craft and sent soldiers stepping off into deep surf.

A German armored drive must seize Antwerp in four days by capturing Allied fuel along the route - can captured gas keep the offensive moving in time? The fuel plan that ran out - could captured gas reach Antwerp in time? In this episode, we lay out the parallel clocks driving a December 16, 1944 offensive: the German timetable to reach Antwerp and the small American units holding the ridge that could slow them. The episode tracks the planning assumptions, intelligence warnings, and the central gamble that the Germans would seize Allied fuel fast enough to continue the push - did that fuel arrive when it mattered? Person: Adolf Hitler Date: December 16, 1944 Location: Ardennes, Belgium Event: Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein (Operation Watch on the Rhine) Person: Colonel Friedrich von der Heydte - German plan assumed captured Allied fuel would bridge a one-third to one-half fuel shortfall for the drive to Antwerp - Original launch slated for November 27, delayed to December 16 due to fuel and supply shortages - German movements used radio silence, teleprinter/telephone lines, and charcoal fires to conceal buildup - Allied intelligence (rail traffic, Luftwaffe activity, truck redeployments, diplomatic decrypts) was compiled and passed up the chain - Omar Bradley’s recorded response to warnings: “Let them come,” while the Ardennes remained a lightly held quiet sector

Colonel Toland leads an 870-man raid toward Wytheville - did the assault make it in time before a shot stopped it? The bullet that struck Toland a second too late - did the raid make it? In this episode, we follow the Union brigade's hundred-mile ride into southwestern Virginia and the choices that steered them into Wytheville on July 18, 1863. The episode traces the mission's aims, the men who led it, and the split-second moments that decided whether three strategic Confederate resources would be destroyed. Person: Colonel John T. Toland Date: July 18, 1863 Location: Wytheville, Virginia Force size: 870 men Targets: Austinville lead mine; Saltville salt works; Virginia and Tennessee Railroad - Toland rode at the head of a mounted brigade tasked to hit three critical Confederate supply sites in one fast raid. - The raid began with an 100-mile approach from the Charleston area and reached Wytheville on the evening of July 18. - Colonel John H. Powell served as Toland’s second in command and advocated a more methodical approach to the town. - The Austinville lead mine supplied roughly one third of Confederate lead for ammunition by mid-1863. - The brigade held Wytheville less than twelve hours, suffering heavy horse and personnel losses while primary objectives remained intact.

Drake held a tiny timber at Prairie D'Âne - did his refusal to retreat buy the Seventh Corps enough time? Drake's refusal to retreat stalled 12,000 Confederates - did the corps make it? In this episode, we follow the morning of April 4, 1864, when a small Union force stood between a dispersed Seventh Corps and a much larger Confederate cavalry force on Prairie D'Âne. The episode lays out the march, the orders, and the critical decision that might determine whether the corps could regroup or be cut to pieces. Date: April 4, 1864 Location: Prairie D'Âne, southwest Arkansas Person: Colonel F. M. Drake Force sizes: ~400 Union vanguard; ~12,000 Confederate troops Commanders: Major General Frederick Steele; Major General Sterling Price - Steele delayed departure from Little Rock and the corps marched into late-season mud with thin supplies. - The Union vanguard (First Iowa Cavalry, 36th Iowa, 43rd Indiana) spread into foraging on April 3 while Confederate cavalry closed in. - Confederate infantry divisions were detached south, leaving Price to contest the prairie primarily with cavalry and state troops. - Scouts and sounds in the timber warned Drake of about 12,000 Confederates moving into position before dawn. - Drake received an order to fall back but refused, leaving roughly 400 men holding a forward line on an open road with two artillery pieces.

A Union regiment probes Kolb's Farm as Confederate columns mass for a five o'clock assault - did the One Hundred Twenty-Third New York get in time? The One Hundred Twenty-Third New York sounded the alarm - did they get in time? In this episode, we follow the afternoon of June 22, 1864, as Union skirmishers report large Confederate formations and commanders decide whether to reinforce exposed lines. The episode tracks the movements, orders, and misread intelligence that set the stage for Hood’s five o’clock attack and asks what choices mattered most in those final hours. Date: June 22, 1864 Event: Kolb's Farm / Atlanta Campaign Person: One Hundred Twenty-Third New York (regiment) Person: John Bell Hood (Confederate corps commander) Location: Kolb's Farm, Georgia - Morning reconnaissance suggested the Powder Springs-Marietta road was lightly held, prompting Sherman’s right wing to press forward. - Overnight redeployment placed Hood’s three divisions (Stevenson, Hindman, Stewart) astride the road, totaling about eleven thousand men. - Hooker’s forward units dug in after skirmishers reported Confederate masses in the woods; the One Hundred Twenty-Third New York and Fourteenth Kentucky made first contact. - Thomas inspected the entrenchments, judged the Union line adequate, and declined to send reinforcements before the afternoon fight. - Hood ordered an attack for five p.m., relying on faulty intelligence that Hooker’s corps was still moving and vulnerable.

A delayed Saltville cavalry leaves a Virginia ridgeline exposed as Union brigades advance toward a wooden bridge - did Crook reach the bridge in time? The delayed Saltville cavalry opened the flank - did Crook reach the bridge? In this episode, we follow Brigadier General George Crook's march through western Virginia, the Confederate command decisions that thinned defenses, and the unfoldment on the morning of May 9, 1864 that centered on a vulnerable New River bridge. What choices and delays decided whether the Union column could sever the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad? Date: May 9, 1864 Person: Brigadier General George Crook Location: New River bridge, Virginia Event: Union advance vs. Confederate ridgeline defense Force sizes: Crook 6,555; McCausland ~2,300; Jenkins ~200; Averell 2,500 cavalry - Crook used deliberate noisy deception-bands, campfires, visible riders, and burned trees-to hide his true southeast march. - Orders sent Crook to march from Fayetteville with 6,555 men to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad and burn the New River bridge. - Confederate leadership redirected forces north toward Staunton, leaving Jenkins with roughly 200 men to hold the corridor Crook targeted. - McCausland assembled about 2,300 men with four artillery pieces on a rocky ridgeline and log parapets overlooking the meadow below. - A Saltville cavalry detachment arrived late and understrength-only about 400 riders reached the field-leaving the Confederate right flank exposed as Union brigades prepared to move.

A river captain turns his cottonclad fleet north to stop a Union squadron on the Mississippi - did they make it in time? River War Won in Two Hours: The Battle of Memphis In this episode, we set the scene on the Memphis waterfront the morning of June 6, 1862, and follow the decisions that put a hastily converted Confederate River War Fleet against a prepared Union flotilla. What choices did commanders make on both sides, and could the cottonclads close the distance they needed before the gunboats shredded them? Person: James E. Montgomery Date: June 6, 1862 Location: Memphis waterfront, Mississippi River Fleet: River War Fleet (cottonclads) vs. Union armored gunboats and rams Problem: cottonclads short on coal and lacking coordinated command - Montgomery, a civilian river captain, commanded eight cottonclads converted in New Orleans with timber, iron cladding, and compressed cotton bales. - The cottonclad crews combined civilian pilots on deck with Army gun crews below who answered to separate officers, creating dual chains of command. - Confederate boats were designed to ram at close quarters and carried light-caliber guns ineffective at the ranges Union Pook turtles engaged from. - The Union advance arrived at 5:47 a.m. with armored gunboats delivering long-range broadsides and unarmed rams held in reserve to close and strike. - With insufficient coal to withdraw to Vicksburg, Montgomery chose between scuttling his fleet or turning north to fight the approaching Union line.

J.E.B. Stuart rides captured Union wagons into Hanover, Pennsylvania - did he make it in time? The 125 Wagons That Slowed Stuart - Did They Cost Gettysburg? In this episode, we follow the sequence of choices and movements that left Robert E. Lee without his cavalry during the opening of the Gettysburg campaign. It chronicles Stuart’s decision to take the Rockville wagon train, the resulting delays through Hanover and Dover, and the mounting urgency as July first approaches. Person: J.E.B. Stuart Event: Seizure of 125 wagons at Rockville, Maryland Location: Hanover, Pennsylvania Date: June 28-30, 1863 Case: Cavalry absence during Lee’s march into Pennsylvania - Stuart seized one hundred and twenty-five heavy Union wagons at Rockville on June 28 and accepted responsibility for moving them. - Stuart intended to push north to Littlestown to link with Ewell and provide intelligence to Lee before the campaign timetable slipped. - Lieutenant Colonel Elijah V. White’s raid on June 27 cut Hanover’s telegraph lines, isolating the town and preventing warnings. - On June 30 Chambliss’s vanguard approached Hanover, encountering Union pickets at Gitt’s Mill and sending the Eighteenth Pennsylvania reeling back into town. - Stuart’s column stretched to seventeen miles and did not fully close until 8:00 AM on July 1 while Gettysburg was already beginning.